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Abstract 
Private standards and certification schemes in agrifood networks tend to be de-
scribed as neoliberal, suggesting that they share a common understanding of that 
which they seek to govern and the tools to be used. Although such certification 
systems do have many features in common, this article argues that much is to be 
learned by contrasting certification systems with regard to their ideational ground-
ings. Through a historically grounded discussion of the adoption and implementa-
tion of two certification systems – GLOBALGAP and Fairtrade – in the Wind-
ward Islands banana industry, it is argued that there are important differences with 
regard to how the systems envision shared key concepts such as accountability, 
adaptability, professionalism and not least sustainability. These differences per-
meate the standards as well as their enforcement structures, demonstrating a flexi-
bility in certification as governmental technology which is often overlooked. 
Moreover, the article explores how the certification systems’ governmental ra-
tionalities articulate with local understandings of the role of farmers and agricul-
ture in the Windward Islands, arguing that the tension existing between the vi-
sions embedded in the systems mirrors a tension within these islands societies. 
This tension preceded the adoption of the certification systems and continues to 
influence their implementation today.  
 
Keywords: Certification, private standards, political rationalities, agrifood  
networks, banana farming, the Windward Islands 
 
  
 722 Culture Unbound, Volume 4, 2012 
Introduction: Certification Systems in the Global Marketplace 
Certification systems constitute a governance tool which despite its relative new-
ness has come to have tremendous influence on global commercial activity, not 
least within international agribusiness. Where the early international standardiza-
tion movement of the late 19th century was coupled to growth in mechanized pro-
duction and dominated by engineers, from the late 1970s and onwards systems 
oriented quality management standards drastically enlarged the scope of that 
which could be governed through standards (Higgins & Hallström 2007). This 
development was followed by what Michael Power, writing of Britain in the 
1990s dubbed the ‘audit explosion’, whereby audit technologies, in the quest for 
‘greater accountability, efficiency and quality’ have come to permeate society 
(1994:1). In the ‘audit society’ the promulgation of standard systems is far from 
the sole prerogative of public agencies and national and international standards 
development organizations such as ISO (Power 1997). These are joined by a host 
of private standard setters such as businesses, industry consortia, NGOs and mul-
ti-stakeholder initiatives.  
In agrifood networks standards and certification schemes enable private parties 
to standardize products, production processes and, by implication, producers.1 
Certification technologies have prospered in the transnational spaces opened by 
free market ideologies advocating political deregulation. Where international 
agreements under the WTO restrict the public regulation of trade, such rules do 
not apply to private parties. Rather, private certification systems are typically con-
strued as depoliticized and value neutral governance tools, their credibility boost-
ed further by techno-scientific discourse (Bain, Ransom & Worosz 2010). None-
theless, certification technology is employed in the reconfiguring of power rela-
tions in agrifood networks, arguably shifting power from the production to the 
market side of the supply chain (Campbell & Le Heron 2007). Using certification, 
supermarkets have been able to define parameters for food quality, or rather quali-
ties, since the term has been applied to an increasingly long list of product and 
production process attributes. Standards and associated certification schemes, 
whether retailer specific or the outcome of industry collaborations, have become 
the supermarkets’ primary supply chain governance tools, and in a globalized 
business environment supermarkets have emerged as key standard setters in agri-
food networks. This supermarket power is not uncontested, however, as social 
movement organizations (SMOs) and to some degree producer groups have also 
developed certification systems seeking to influence the manner in which agrifood 
networks operate. Still, if they are to succeed in moving the retailers, they need to 
foster and maintain a consumer demand for their certified products which major 
retailers cannot afford to ignore.  
One may distinguish between two main approaches to the use of certification 
in agrifood networks: certification aimed at product differentiation and certifica-
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tion for supply chain management purposes (Henson & Humphrey 2010). In what 
has been dubbed the ‘economy of qualities’, certification has allowed sophisticat-
ed product differentiation to address the manifold tastes and concerns of a differ-
entiated mass of consumers. Most prominently, certification allows the standardi-
zation of products with respect to what information economists call credence at-
tributes, i.e. qualities which remain concealed to the consumer even after the point 
of consumption (Darby & Karni, 1973). A label on a product, when backed by a 
credible certification scheme, purportedly renders visible attributes of the product 
or the production process, which would otherwise have remained hidden. SMOs 
and others involved in standard setting have used this approach to enable consum-
ers to ‘see behind’ the product itself. Because certification in this regard is ulti-
mately directed at the consumer, such schemes are referred to as business-to-
consumer (B2C) or labelling schemes. Early examples were organic certification 
initiatives pioneered in the 1970s (Dankers & Liu 2003). In contrast, certifications 
used for supply chain management typically remain hidden to the consumer and 
are known in certification jargon as business-to-business (B2B) schemes, their 
function being to convey information between firms. In many cases they are re-
tailer risk management tools with a significant emphasis on food safety and trace-
ability, sometimes accompanied by social and environmental considerations. Such 
food safety schemes began to appear in the UK in the 1990s in response to food 
scares (Henson & Caswell 1999), increased media and NGO scrutiny (Loader & 
Hobbs 1999) and enhanced food safety legislation (Hobbs & Kerr 1992), which 
had the supermarket chains fear bad publicity as well as legal liability generated 
by events in their supply chains. 
The simplicity and versatility of certification – the apparent ease with which it 
transforms a multitude of complex and messy realities into easily digestible pieces 
of information – has had a tremendous appeal to private regulators who in turn 
have contributed to a constantly growing market for certification systems. A big 
part of this market consists of what is often referred to as sustainability standards, 
which may include both B2C and B2B standards (Riisgaard 2009). The multitude 
of sometimes rivalling sustainability standards reflects power struggles, differ-
ences of emphasis and contesting notions of how sustainability can and should be 
codified in standards and certification schemes. Being market based and seeming-
ly depoliticised, sustainability certification, like audit technologies more general-
ly, tend to be depicted as essentially neoliberal tools of governance (Higgins & 
Hallström 2007; Guthman 2008). In terms of governmentality, this would imply 
that they also share in building on a neoliberal political rationality, i.e. ideas, val-
ues, principles and knowledge framing that which is to be governed (Djama, 
Fouilleux & Vagneron 2011: 189). Critics of sustainability certification have ar-
gued that because these initiatives are products of ‘thinking inside the neoliberal 
box’ (Guthman 2008), the kind of change they can produce is severely restricted 
(Fridell 2006). However, an outright dismissal of market based certification on the 
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grounds of an assumed ‘neoliberal nature’ may be to gloss over important differ-
ences in how certification systems are structured and operate. A more informative 
approach may be to compare such systems with regard to their ideational ground-
ings.  
This article sets out to carry out such a comparison of two certification systems 
being applied to the same object of governance: the banana industry of the Wind-
ward Islands in the Eastern Caribbean. The two systems – GLOBALGAP and 
Fairtrade – are, due to retailer and consumer demand, de facto mandatory for ba-
nana growers on these islands who produce for the UK retail market. While the 
systems are similar in several respects – both may be included under the rubric of 
sustainability certification – I argue that they also represent different forms of 
governmentality which is reflected in the manner that certification is employed as 
governmental technology. In the following I will begin by presenting the histori-
cal background of the Windward Islands banana industry before going on to dis-
cus, in chronological order, the adoption and implementation of the two certifica-
tion systems. The historically grounded discussion seeks to present the systems in 
some detail in order to highlight what they set out to achieve and how. From that 
discussion I proceed with a further exploration of what kind of farmer and agricul-
tural sector the schemes explicitly or implicitly seek to create and how well these 
visions resonate with the banana industry stakeholders. While I believe the discus-
sion has a general validity for the Windward Islands banana industry as a whole, it 
is informed particularly by the situation in St. Vincent, where I conducted a year 
of field research from July 2008 to August 2009.  
The Windward Islands Banana Industry 
When the UK company Geest in the early 1950s agreed to purchase all export 
grade bananas from the Windward Islands, i.e. St. Vincent and the Grenadines, 
Dominica, St. Lucia and Grenada, the event marked the beginning of a new era 
for these small British colonies. The sugar industries, which had once rendered 
them so attractive to England, had by the end of the 19th century collapsed and 
economic alternatives were few. Consequently unemployment levels were high 
and living conditions difficult for the many who had relied on the plantations for 
an income. Fearing social unrest the colonial administration in St. Vincent fol-
lowed the recommendations of the 1897 West India Royal Commission and initi-
ated land settlement schemes at the turn of the century (Fraser 1986; John 2006). 
Through the acquisition of marginal and unproductive estate lands, which were 
surveyed and sold in small lots, the number of holdings of less than 10 acres grew 
from 46 in 1896 to 7 459 in 1946. Because lots were commonly subdivided, 
moreover, more than half of these measured less than one acre (John 2006: 53, 
86). The smallholders eagerly embraced the opportunity to grow and export bana-
nas to a guaranteed market in Britain and, as Trouillot (1988) has noted, this was 
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linked to the comparative suitability of bananas over alternative crops to a peasant 
mode of production. Geest, on its part, had been encouraged by the British gov-
ernment which gave preferential terms to bananas from its colonial sources. Ba-
nana exports grew quickly to become the backbone of the fragile Windward Is-
land economies. Particular note must be made of the ‘banana boom’ taking place 
from the mid-1980s to the early 1990s. During those years, more than in any other 
period, the banana truly lived up to its nickname ‘green gold’. Money from bana-
na exports transformed the islands, making new consumption patterns and life-
styles available, even to the poorest. By 1990, banana exports accounted for over 
20 percent of the GDP and over 80 percent of total agricultural exports in the 
three islands of Dominica, St. Lucia and St. Vincent, while almost 37 percent of 
agricultural land was under banana cultivation (Nurse & Sandiford 1995: 4). From 
1992 and onwards, however, in response to the likely erosion of trade preferences 
in Europe and continued challenges posed by weather events, ecological restraints 
and high production costs, the industries went into a steady decline which has 
continued until the present day. In this prolonged decline the boom remains a his-
torical reference point and a constant reminder of the wealth that banana had the 
potential to bring in.  
The Windward Islands banana industry had always had difficulties associated 
with managing large numbers of growers, many of them ill-equipped and unpro-
ductive (Spinelli 1973:189). For this reason Geest had demanded not to deal with 
individual growers but with Banana Growers’ Associations (BGAs) on each is-
land (Reid 2000). The BGAs bought the bananas from the growers, regulated pro-
duction and provided extension services. From 1958 an umbrella organization, 
WINBAN, was charged inter alia with negotiating contracts with Geest and with 
pursuing research and development focused on agronomic practices, postharvest 
handling and technology transfer (La Gra & Marte 1987:122). This was more or 
less the setup until the post-boom period of the 1990s when threats to the viability 
of the Windward Islands banana industry seemed to require drastic changes in the 
organizational structures as well as growers’ practices. The boom period aside, 
environmental and economic conditions had from the onset left the industry de-
pending not just on preferential access to the UK market, but also on a series of 
injections of aid from the British government to stay afloat (Grossman 1994). As 
Grossman points out, these interventions, including the preferential access, were 
conceived of as temporary measures to allow the industry to get on a competitive 
footing, but quality issues and low productivity have remained substantial causes 
of concern throughout much of the industry’s life span.  
Survival by Certification? 
When European integration by the early 1990s seemed to threaten the continua-
tion of trade preferences for Windward Island bananas, growers as well as gov-
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ernments began to fear for the future of the industry. A number of consultancy 
reports commissioned on behalf of the industry by entities such as the Caribbean 
Development Bank, the EC and the British Overseas Development Administration 
agreed that the way forward was one of restructuring and rationalization (Lewis 
1998). A lax attitude toward growers was identified as the main reason for the 
industry’s difficulties and essential components of the restructuring exercise were 
therefore held to be the cultivation of a stronger market orientation on the part of 
the industry as a whole and, critically, the elimination of poorly performing grow-
ers. Cargill, for instance, stated that  
the present non-discriminatory approach to grower services, fruit purchasing and 
market feedback will have to be replaced with one that allows the [BGAs] to consol-
idate their support to growers who adhere to cultivation practices [and] are dependa-
ble suppliers of quality fruit [...] (Cargill Technical Services 1995: 23) 
The message was clear: Europe’s likely withdrawal of the protection it had of-
fered Windward bananas would force the banana industry to withdraw the protec-
tion it had offered its growers. Any kind of direct subsidization or cross-
subsidization of unproductive growers would have to cease (Lewis 1998). From a 
neoliberal point of view such subsidies were counterproductive and dangerous, 
yet the extensive participation of marginal growers in the industry ensured a wide 
distribution of wealth and added to highly beneficial multiplier effects (Grossman 
2003). Politicians and industry officials were no doubt aware of this, but seemed 
to accept changes as a necessary evil. In the face of impending trade liberalization 
the choice was perceived as being between the implementation of a socially dis-
ruptive industry reform and an altogether abandonment of the banana industry. 
One point at which all consultants agreed, however, was that there was no real 
alternative to bananas in terms of contribution to the economy (Lewis 1998).  
One of the first results to come of the restructuring was the replacement in 
1994 of WINBAN with a new, private entity, WIBDECO, part owned by the gov-
ernments and the BGAs.2 WIBDECO was to focus more on business and less on 
research than what had been the case with WINBAN. In 1996 the company was 
able to acquire, in a joint venture with the Ireland-based multinational fruit com-
pany Fyffes, Geest’s banana division, thereby entering into the marketing and 
distribution of bananas (Clegg 2002). With a presence in the market place, WI-
BDECO soon began work to channel more produce away from the wholesale 
markets and into the better paying but more quality conscious retail sector. The 
primary means of achieving this was to be the implementation of a farm certifica-
tion system – The Certified Growers’ Programme (CGP) – tailor-made by WI-
BDECO to develop ‘a pool of farmers/farms capable of producing, processing and 
packaging bananas to meet the specific requirements of the Multiples’ (Allardyce 
2000: 3).3 The multiples’ concerns were divided between being able to offer pre-
mium quality products at competitive prices and being pro-active in the face of 
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growing public attention to issues such as food safety, environmental health and 
worker welfare.  
In some respects the CGP carried a close resemblance to other farm certifica-
tion systems developed in the mid-1990s, the standards building on notions of 
integrated crop management (ICM) and integrated pest management (IPM), pre-
scribing efficient agronomic practices and minimal and responsible use of agro-
chemicals. Yet, the standard was written very specifically to facilitate the rational-
ization of the Windward Islands banana industry and as such contained require-
ments intended to weed out growers seen to lack the prerequisites of viable farm 
operations. Important minimum requirements sought to disqualify farms with un-
suitable terrain, inadequate rainfall or irrigation, a lack of road access and inap-
propriate packing sheds for fruit processing (Allardyce 2000). Moreover, the CGP 
contained quality standards for the produce itself and failure to maintain a high 
and consistent quality score would lead to decertification. Certification was volun-
tary but only certified growers would be able to sell fruit to the multiples and be 
rewarded with a price premium. However, the way the certification process was 
designed led growers to question the scheme’s impartiality (Hubbard, Herbert, & 
de la Touche 2000). Certification officers were WIBDECO employees and could 
have experienced pressure from the company as well as the governments to ‘go 
easy’ on certain growers.  
Clissold has noted that the CGP and the attached price premium ‘brought into 
the open the unresolved question of whether the institutions in the banana industry 
had primarily social or economic objectives’ (Clissold 2001: 7). There was great 
dissatisfaction among a segment of growers that local policies were not designed 
to counteract the effects of market pressures but to adapt to them. By the late 
1990s many found themselves as vulnerable as ever, struggling to break even 
while being asked to comply with complex requirements. Disputes over the size 
of the price premium and allegations over supposedly favourable treatment of 
larger growers increased tension within the grower base and pressure mounted on 
politicians who worried about alienating an important segment of voters. Signifi-
cant numbers of growers left the industry, the estimated number of active growers 
shrinking from 25 000 in 1992 to 9 400 in 2001 (Grossman 2003: 313). While 
many of these undoubtedly belonged to a category of growers deemed ill suited, 
some growers believed the price premium did not adequately compensate for ad-
ditional labour requirements (Allardyce 2000), and consequently those who gave 
up banana farming may have included growers who would have been able to cer-
tify but chose not to. At the same time, a lack of assistance to growers choosing to 
exit the industry may have dissuaded those with no alternative source of income 
from doing so (Hubbard, et al. 2000).  
In 2000, Bernard Cornibert, CEO of WIBDECO in the UK, described the CGP 
as having ‘faltered because of divisions in the banana industry’ and argued that to 
regain the trust of the supermarkets it was necessary to ‘relaunch [the programme] 
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with more stringent application of the code of practice’ (St. Lucia Online 2000). 
The CGP was never relaunched, but some of its functions would eventually be 
taken over by GLOBALGAP, a certification system devised by the retailers them-
selves. Prior to that, however, the Windward Island banana growers had respond-
ed to the developments of the 1990s by introducing another certification system. 
Fairtrade, in contrast to the CGP, was heralded as offering new hope to the many 
growers facing uncertain futures in the face of market liberalization. 
Fairtrade 
When the first shipment of Fairtrade certified bananas from the Windward Islands 
became available to British consumers on July 25, 2000 (Liddell 2000), it was an 
event which could easily be seen as a direct challenge to the objectives of the in-
dustry restructuring and the CGP. Indeed, a report from the UK Fairtrade Founda-
tion published shortly after expressed hope that Fairtrade in the Windward Islands 
would ‘embrace many of the smaller and poorer producers who have not been 
able to participate in the Certified Growers Programme’ (Liddell 2000: 17). ‘If 
successful’, the report states, ‘sales of Fairtrade Windward Island bananas will 
offer hope to thousands of farmers, make farming worthwhile for thousands more, 
and eventually encourage back destitute farmers who had long since given up the 
struggle’ (Liddell 2000: 18). How could it be that the Windward Islands banana 
industry now found itself implementing two certification systems with such ap-
parently contradictory objectives? The short answer is that the two systems were 
promoted by different actors within the industry. Where the CGP was introduced 
by WIBDECO, Fairtrade certification came about as a result of the actions of 
growers looking after their own interest.  
The NGO-driven Fairtrade certification system emerged with the objective of 
reducing poverty and empowering producers in the global South. More specifical-
ly the initiative aimed to assist smallholders in collectively lifting themselves out 
of exploitative and unsustainable trade relationships by creating linkages with 
concerned importers and consumers in the North. To make it possible for con-
sumers to recognize Fairtrade products these carry a label – the Fairtrade Mark – 
which is owned, along with the Fairtrade standards, by the Germany-based NGO 
Fairtrade International4. The Fairtrade standards address the trade relationships as 
well as the production process, reflecting the view that decent terms of trade are a 
prerequisite for sustainable production. The trade standards therefore require, 
among other things, that buyers pay producers a minimum price which is to be 
adjusted at regular intervals so as always to cover the cost of sustainable produc-
tion. On top of this producers are to receive a Fairtrade premium intended to pro-
mote sustainable development. The production standards are to some degree 
product specific, standards existing today for 15 product ranges as well as compo-
site products, but all address social, socioeconomic, and environmental develop-
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ment, as well as labour conditions.5 A core principle in the Fairtrade standards is 
that producers should be organized in small producer organizations (SPOs)6, re-
quired to operate in a democratic, transparent, and non-discriminative manner 
with an overarching aim to ‘promote the environmentally-sustainable social and 
economic development of the organization and its members’ (Fairtrade Labelling 
Organizations International 2009: 6). The Fairtrade standards are directed at the 
SPO and not the individual grower and consequently the annual Fairtrade audit is 
an audit of the SPO and not of members’ farm operations. While a Fairtrade ba-
nana grower is required to comply with restrictions on the use of herbicides and 
maintain pesticide free buffer zones next to streams and roads, the onus is on the 
SPO to educate, facilitate and cultivate awareness among its members so that they 
abide by the rules.  
Fairtrade’s emphasis on collective action resonates well with the philosophy of 
the organization which brought the concept of Fairtrade to the Windward Islands. 
The Windward Islands Farmers’ Association (WINFA), was formally launched in 
1987 with a secretariat in St. Vincent, as an umbrella body for national farmers’ 
organizations in the four Windward Islands (Rittgers & La Gra 1991). From the 
beginning, WINFA promoted farmers’ democratic participation in development 
processes and acknowledged the importance of creating linkages and alliances 
nationally and internationally in order to foster awareness and solidarity and to 
improve farmers’ socio-economic well-being (Rittgers & La Gra 1991: 131). 
WINFA’s international network included Christian Aid and Oxfam in Britain, and 
these NGOs sponsored and co-ordinated a WINFA fact-finding mission to the UK 
and Belgium in 1992 to learn more about the likely consequences of European 
integration. The trip linked WINFA with pioneers of the European fair trade 
movement, initiating the process which culminated in Fairtrade certification and 
the export of Fairtrade bananas in 2000.  
Still, it had been no easy task for WINFA to convince politicians and industry 
officials in the Windward Islands to lend their support to the Fairtrade initiative. 
Renwick Rose, co-ordinator of the ’92 delegation and for many years WINFA 
coordinator, has asserted that the leaders of the St. Vincent Banana Growers’ As-
sociation (SVBGA) at first would not ‘touch Fairtrade with a ten-foot pole’ and 
that the people in WINFA were ‘scoffed at as dreamers, out of touch with the real-
ities of the banana industry’ (Rose 2009). The conflict was one of ideas as well as 
of the actors championing them; of governmental and programmatic differences 
as well as of industry leadership. Already in 1992 WINFA had noted with regret 
the ‘pettiness on the part of officials in the banana industry and Governments, 
reflected in their unwillingness to cooperate with WINFA, perhaps in thinking 
that WINFA was stealing the limelight’ (WINFA 1993: 12). It is quite possible 
that WINFA’s active role in promoting fair trade was interpreted by some industry 
officials as the actions of a competitor vying for control. Considering that a degree 
of paternalism saturated the industry it seems likely that a governance initiative 
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advocated by growers would be dismissed by industry leaders. These leaders 
could have feared that WINFA, using Fairtrade, would mobilize growers to chal-
lenge their positions of power.7 Moreover, a number of growers suggested to me 
during fieldwork that the opposition of certain key figures to Fairtrade was due 
not so much to Fairtrade ideational content as to their own lack of influence over 
the scheme. Yet, there was obviously also a clash of ideas and real disagreement 
as to what was the best path forward for the industry. Fairtrade was offering an 
alternative to the neoliberal vision of rationalization and for someone subscribing 
to the view that competitiveness could only be achieved through a leaner industry 
where responsibility was clearly individualized Fairtrade must definitely have 
appeared as a step in the wrong direction. The paradox was that Fairtrade made 
sense from a business point of view as there was a large, untapped market for 
Fairtrade bananas in the UK. When WIBDECO realized this the BGAs were giv-
en no choice but to accept Fairtrade as a new order of business.  
From a cautious first shipment of some 1 800 boxes of bananas, the Fairtrade 
exports grew significantly over the succeeding years in response to increasing 
demand (Smith 2010; Fairtrade Foundation 2011). By 2009, 90 percent of the 
bananas exported to the UK were sold on Fairtrade terms, the explicit goal being a 
total switch. More than 90 percent of the Windward Islands banana farmers, num-
bering some 3 300, had joined the Fairtrade scheme (Fairtrade Foundation 2010). 
Fairtrade farmers belong to national Fairtrade organizations (NFTOs) which are 
recognized as members of WINFA, and WINFA, being the Fairtrade certificate 
holder, acts as the NFTOs’ co-ordinator. Each NFTO is, however, largely auton-
omous and democratically run by its membership with members organized in lo-
cal Fairtrade groups which hold meetings on a monthly basis. While Fairtrade 
exports grew rapidly to constitute a large share of total exports, growers continued 
to exit the industry and the total exports continued to decline in the new century. 
In the case of St. Vincent the tonnage exported fell by almost 60 percent between 
2000 and 2007 and the number of active growers was reduced to less than one 
third (Fridell 2011). Arriving in St. Vincent in July 2008 I found that Fairtrade 
certification, while still controversial and drawing fire in some quarters, had been 
accepted as indispensible by most in the banana industry, as had the role played 
by WINFA. Yet, the general consensus was that the industry was in deep crisis 
and that growers were barely scraping by. The tensions between two partly con-
tradicting visions for the industry persisted, now expressed through the parallel 
implementation of Fairtrade and GLOBALGAP. 
GLOBALGAP 
GLOBALGAP, an acronym for Global Good Agricultural Practice, are sets of 
sector specific pre-farm gate standards emphasising food safety, but also covering 
areas such as environmental protection, traceability, animal welfare and worker 
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health and safety. The initiative grew out of coalition of European retailers estab-
lished in 1997 under the name EUREP (Euro-Retailer Produce Working Group) 
(GLOBALG.A.P., n.d.). The secretariat is hosted in Germany and the membership 
is international, but GLOBALGAP is in many ways the offspring of the Assured 
Produce Scheme (APS), a British domestic farm certification system based on 
ICM principles (van der Grijp 2007). The APS was designed in the early 1990s 
with the objective of harmonizing the multiples’ various food safety codes for 
domestic producers. Having achieved this much, the UK multiples quickly identi-
fied the need for a similar system holding their foreign suppliers to the same 
standard and took the initiative to set up EUREP (van der Grijp 2007). 
The first EUREP protocol, with a scope covering fruits and vegetables, was 
ready in 1999 and named EUREPGAP (Möller 1999). The standard was devised 
as a generic HACCP approach to farming, requiring producers to identify poten-
tial risks, plan for their control and identify action to be taken in the event that 
predefined critical limits are breached. The standard is comprehensive, covering 
farm activity from the seed stage to the dispatch of the final product (Campbell 
2005). Since the introduction of the first protocol, it has been revised three times 
(in 2004, 2007 and 2010) and with the third edition in 2007 the name of the certi-
fication system, as well as the organization responsible for it, was changed to 
GLOBALGAP, reflecting the initiative’s global ambitions and expanding reach.8 
Indeed, GLOBALGAP promotes itself as ‘the global partnership for safe and sus-
tainable agriculture’ and currently more than 100 000 certificates are awarded in 
over 100 countries (GLOBALG.A.P. 2010). Over the years a number of scopes 
and sub-scopes have been added so that GLOBALGAP today offers ‘integrated 
farm assurance’ relevant for a wide range of farm enterprises, including livestock 
and aquaculture. Importantly, GLOBALGAP is a B2B scheme as producers’ certi-
fication status is only communicated to buyers. This underscores GLOBALGAP’s 
function as a supply chain management tool for maintaining baseline standards, to 
which other systems, such as Fairtrade, may be added for product differentiation.  
A key driver behind the GLOBALGAP venture was the need to harmonize al-
ready existing standards. It was believed that having one globally recognized 
standard for food safety would be beneficial to suppliers as well as retailers, al-
lowing both parties more flexibility. In other words, GLOBALGAP was created 
to replace other standards such as the CGP or proprietary supermarket codes, or if 
not to replace them, to function as a benchmark standard against which other 
standards could be recognized as equivalent (Bain, Deaton & Busch 2005; van der 
Grijp, Marsden & Cavalcanti 2005). GLOBALGAP offers four different ‘certifi-
cation options’. Under options 1 and 3 individual producers apply for either 
GLOBALGAP certification or certification through a benchmarked scheme. Op-
tions 2 and 4 give the same alternatives to producer groups. Potentially the CGP 
could have been developed into a benchmarked scheme, but this was considered 
too time consuming and WIBDECO therefore decided upon option 2 (Sylvester 
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Vanloo, interview, May 15, 2009). As a producer group WIBDECO accepted re-
sponsibility for running a quality management system (QMS) covering all grow-
ers included under the scheme. All registered growers are subject to annual in-
spections while the QMS itself is subject to an annual external audit by an accred-
ited certification body.  
The standard consists of three kinds of requirements classified according to 
their importance. To become certified a grower must comply with all ‘major 
musts’ and 95 percent of ‘minor musts’. Additionally there are requirements clas-
sified as recommendations, with which compliance is not required. A grower fail-
ing to pass the inspection must carry out corrective action within a time period not 
exceeding 28 days, but may, in severe cases, be suspended (GLOBALG.A.P. 
2007). While the rigorous focus on scheme integrity and the comprehensiveness 
of GLOBALGAP clearly differed from the CGP, the core content would have 
been recognizable to growers familiar with the latter. For instance, the concepts of 
ICM and IPM were of central importance to the GLOBALGAP standard setters 
(Möller 1999: 18). About half of the control points deal with pesticides or produce 
handling. Other important areas are workers’ health, safety and welfare, fertiliser 
use, harvesting practices, propagation materials, site and soil management and 
irrigation. For each control point, compliance criteria specify how the inspector 
should verify compliance, requiring different kinds of action on behalf of the 
grower. Broadly speaking the inspector tests a grower’s knowledge by asking 
questions and asking for demonstrations when possible, but he also assesses the 
farm, including equipment, protective gear, infrastructure and signage, and docu-
mentation presented by the grower. This documentation includes the grower’s 
own records of farm activity, training certificates, various risk assessments, plans 
and policies, invoices, a farm map and pack shed site plan. 
The GLOBALGAP standard is subjected to a regular revision cycle reflecting a 
commitment to continuous improvement, and my arrival in St. Vincent in July 
2008 coincided with the implementation of version 3 of the standard containing 
several new control points and the reclassification of others. Growers were clearly 
finding it difficult to comply with the revised standard, and in June 2009, only just 
over 40 percent of about 1 000 active growers in St. Vincent had been able certify 
(WINFARM 2009). During this period, various actors in the industry were seek-
ing to assist growers in different ways. Importantly, the extension officers, acting 
as growers’ technical advisors, are charged with educating farmers about the re-
quirements. Moreover, producer group certification allows for the centralization 
of certain tasks, such the carrying out of generic risk assessments, the provision of 
materials such as record books and signage, the calibration of scales, the provision 
of various specifications for infrastructure, and the conducting of training sessions 
for growers and workers to acquire formal competency in key areas such as pesti-
cides, hygiene and first aid. Some of these tasks are taken care of by WIBDECO, 
but the BGAs, the NFTOs and to some degree the governments all have responsi-
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bilities. The assistance provided clearly relieves the growers of much work. How-
ever, since the growers are ultimately held responsible at the time of the inspec-
tion their reliance on support also renders them vulnerable if that support should 
fail to materialize.  
It is my impression from interviews and from listening to growers’ discussions 
that many of them felt let down or betrayed by one party or another. The exten-
sion officers, working for the SVBGA, were crucial in bringing growers ‘up to 
standard’, yet I heard a number of growers complain of being neglected by their 
officer. This may or may not have been the case but some extension officers cer-
tainly had far better reputations than others. From time to time there were also 
complaints that WIBDECO’s team of internal inspectors was understaffed and 
consequently unable to inspect growers by their recertification deadlines. A cause 
of concern in the preparation for the 2008 external audit – essentially an audit of 
the QMS along with farm inspections to cross check a sample of growers – was 
that growers with irrigated farms had not received the required risk assessment on 
irrigation water pollution which was to be carried out by the Ministry of Agricul-
ture. This automatically resulted in two minor must non-compliances (both con-
trol points elevated from recommendations in version 2). Another minor must 
non-compliance (also elevated from a recommendation in version 2) was given to 
several growers for lacking evidence of first aid training, even if no training ses-
sions had been held for them to participate in that year. Other requirements which 
caused difficulties pertained to infrastructure such as packing sheds, dining areas, 
and pit toilets. There was some confusion as to what these control points actually 
entailed and improvements were associated with some expenditure, leaving grow-
ers depending on assistance provided by the NFTO. Finally, a constant cause of 
concern among industry officials and extension officers were growers’ shortcom-
ings with regard to record keeping. In order to rectify this, efforts were made to 
train growers through workshops, yet industry officials argued that the root of the 
problem was a low level of literacy and growers were therefore encouraged to 
enlist the help of children or others who could be able to assist. In practice, how-
ever, extension officers were often expected to do record keeping along with 
growers.  
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Recreating the Vincentian Banana Farmer  
The certification systems discussed in the preceding pages represent different ap-
proaches to the private governance of agricultural production and trade. Table 1 
summarizes the key characteristics of the systems, revealing distinct similarities 
and differences. The CGP has been included in the table for its historical signifi-
cance, yet the discussion in the following will centre on GLOBALGAP and 
Fairtrade, the two systems currently being implemented.  
Table 1: Characteristics of certification systems in the Windward Islands banana in-
dustry 
As ‘global’, private certification systems designed to be applicable to a wide 
range of product types, addressing social and environmental aspects of production 
and relying on certification by purportedly independent and ISO Guide 65 accred-
ited certification bodies, GLOBALGAP and Fairtrade clearly share important fea-
tures making it possible to speak of them as variations of a neoliberal mode of 
governance. Yet, in other respects the two systems evidently differ. GLOBLGAP, 
as a B2B scheme is essentially a supply chain management tool whereas Fairtrade 
is a B2C scheme and aimed at assisting consumers making shopping choices. 
GLOBALGAP was designed by commercial actors to address market and con-
sumer concerns whereas Fairtrade originated in civil society and addresses the 
producers’ conditions. Perhaps the most critical difference, however, and one that 
is easily overlooked, is that GLOBALGAP is aimed at individual growers and 
seeks to inidvidualize responsibility, whereas Fairtrade is aimed at producer or-
ganizations and seeks to collectivize responsibility. For this reason, Vincentian 
banana growers always think of GLOBALGAP when they speak of becoming 
certified, whereas Fairtrade is something they see themselves as either ‘joining’ or 
not. In the final part of this paper I attempt to build on this formal comparison by 
comparing the standard systems with regard to what kind of farmer they implicitly 
or explicitly require. The discussion, which is necessarily quite cursory, is focused 
around some key qualities that the standards, to a varying degree and manner 
seem to request, i.e. accountability, adaptability, professionalism and sustainabil-
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ity-mindedness. One manner in which the standard systems differ notably is in 
detailing how such qualities are to be operationalized.  
The Accountable Grower 
Notions of accountability through audits and inspections are of course central to 
certification systems in general. The new Chief Executive of Fairtrade Interna-
tional, Harriet Lamb, has e.g. asserted that ‘you can trust the FAIRTRADE Mark 
because we trust no one’ (Fairtrade Foundation 2008: 8). The attitude epitomizes 
how certification’s appeal as a governance tool relies on perceptions of scheme 
integrity among those whom certification addresses. Certification represents a 
transfer of trust from the parties subject to certification, to a system which holds 
these parties accountable; ‘from operatives to auditors’ (Power 1994: 6). Yet, as 
we have seen there are clear differences in how the Windward Islands banana 
growers are held accountable by the certification systems discussed. Where the 
GLOBALGAP standard emphasises each and every grower’s responsibility, the 
Fairtrade standard addresses the collective. The producer organization is held ac-
countable for establishing relationships of reciprocal accountability between itself 
and its members. In essence, the growers must decide through the organization 
how they are to be held accountable to it and vice versa. To the extent that 
Fairtrade requires growers to give account during the annual audit (e.g. through 
visits to farms and Fairtrade group meetings), the questions asked have the inten-
tion of assessing this reciprocal accountability. Arguably GLOBALGAP also re-
quires the producer organization to be held accountable, but this is ultimately to 
ensure that it acts as an intermediary layer of control over the growers. The pro-
ducer organization is purely a pragmatic means of making feasible the certifica-
tion of smallholders. This is a fundamental difference in the rationalities of 
Fairtrade and GLOBALGAP, reflecting their respective primary concerns of safe 
food and development.9  
To my surprise I found that for many Vincentian banana growers, the notion of 
being held accountable by the Fairtrade group is more difficult to accept than the 
notion of being held accountable through farm inspections. As has been duly not-
ed in research on Caribbean societies (cf. Wilson 1973; Abrahams 1983), auton-
omy and individualism are culturally highly valued traits. With a historical point 
of reference being slavery and the exploitative labour extraction of the plantation 
sector, land tenure for the emerging peasantry became emblematic of newly won 
freedom and farming provided an opportunity to be independent and self-made 
(Grossman 1998). Carla Slocum has noted that in St. Lucia ‘growing bananas was 
a means of achieving autonomy, a flexible work schedule, avoidance of an em-
ployer’s overseeing, and individual security’ (Slocum 2006: 95). Yet, Slocum also 
makes note of another and co-existing discourse on farming, which complains 
about the strict control over the grower. Somewhat paradoxically it may be that 
this second discourse is strengthened through Fairtrade, at least if the reciprocal 
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accountability emphasised by Fairtrade is experienced as an exercise in social 
control. The producer organization is after all made up of fellow growers and even 
if the annual GLOBALGAP inspection is far more rigorous, GLOBALGAP re-
mains a faceless authority through most of the year and possibly feels less intru-
sive because of that. GLOBALGAP’s individualized accountability may resonate 
better with the larger and more self-reliant producers who were doing well under 
the CGP and resent the influence of smaller, less efficient or quality conscious 
growers over the industry. An anecdote illustrates this tension: Several of the 
larger producers were opposed to Fairtrade from the beginning and never became 
certified, preferring instead to ply their own business in the regional market. In 
2008, some of them established an export company targeting the market in Trini-
dad. At this company’s first general meeting in 2009 there was a good deal of 
discussion about quality issues which had lost the company a major customer. 
One grower suggested that the company begin to do spot checks of the produce 
before shipping. The managing director, however, dismissed this outright and 
asked rhetorically why an honest grower should ever have to pay for checking 
another grower’s bananas. 
The Adaptable Grower 
The proliferation of standard systems in international agrifood networks since the 
1990s can be understood as attempts by variously situated actors to re-regulate 
liberalized markets, whether to accommodate increasingly differentiated consum-
er tastes, or to manage risks (Henson & Humphrey 2010). Standards themselves 
represent adaptations to changing circumstances. And standards, of course, re-
gardless of their objectives, require others to adapt to them. The issue of adapta-
bility is particularly salient with respect to the impact of certification schemes in 
the Windward Islands banana industry. As we have seen, the CGP was a tool in-
tended to allow the industry to reconfigure around a core group of progressive 
growers, i.e. those able to adapt to new and changing realities. The assumption 
was that some growers had what it took to compete and some not, and that the 
role of certification was to separate the one kind from the other. This explicit ob-
jective of ‘weeding out’ is not present in GLOBALGAP. However, GLOBAL-
GAP with its myriad of control points and compliance criteria presents an even 
more formidable demand on farmers’ ability to adapt, not least because the stand-
ard is continually revised and must be interpreted with an eye to local condi-
tions.10  
In the section on GLOBALGAP I gave several examples illustrating how ba-
nana growers in St. Vincent – and I suspect the situation is similar on the other 
islands – are far from self-reliant in meeting certification requirements. While the 
provision of extension services and various kinds of support has been required 
throughout the history of the banana industry, it is my conviction that GLOBAL-
GAP certification requirements have intensified growers’ dependence on others. 
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The dependence will necessarily be most acute as the introduction of a revised 
standard forces the industry to accommodate to new or changed requirements. If 
future revisions are less extensive and growers become familiar with the logic of 
the standards, the problem may go away. However, with the industry finding itself 
in a state of crisis and growers lacking confidence in the future, GLOBALGAP’s 
emphasis on continuous improvement is likely to have contributed to the contin-
ued exodus of growers.  
Exaggerating somewhat, where GLOBLGAP requires adaptability, Fairtrade 
seeks to facilitate it. The Fairtrade standard is intended to empower growers, 
through the building of organizational capacity and economic leverage, so that 
they are able to collectively tackle challenges and adapt to changing circumstanc-
es. Fairtrade can for instance facilitate farmers in complying with other standards, 
the premium in several cases having been used to facilitate a transition into organ-
ic farming (Nelson & Pound 2009). In St. Vincent the NFTO saw it as a priority to 
assist and encourage farmers in becoming GLOBALGAP certified, as captured by 
the theme of the its 2009 general assembly: ‘Farmers revitalize, become certified, 
keep banana alive’. The NFTO assisted its members by allocating Fairtrade pre-
mium for the provision of materials to build pit toilets and lunch rooms and to 
improve pack sheds, but perhaps the most important manner in which the organi-
zation would facilitate adaptability was by providing channels and arenas for the 
dissemination and exchange of information.  
The Professional Grower 
Common assertions among industry officials in the Windward Island banana in-
dustry is that the majority of growers are not treating farming as a profession, that 
they lack business acumen, that they do not make plans or reflect on their business 
choices, and that they aim for short-term rather than long-term profits. The picture 
painted is of someone who did not become farmer by choice, but because of tradi-
tion or necessity – someone lacking the skills or formal qualifications necessary 
for other careers. This was the kind of grower that the banana industry traditional-
ly was set up to accommodate for. To ensure that growers reinvested in their 
farms, a cess was deducted from their payments and had to be retrieved in kind as 
fertilizer. The arrangement is still in place although in a somewhat modified form 
and as far as I could tell is not controversial. Clissold (2001: 6) has also noted 
paternalistic attitudes in the BGAs which in her view have prevented a transfor-
mation of growers into ‘independent-minded, innovative problem-solvers – the 
mentality now required for survival in the new era’.  
The term ‘professionalism’, as used in lamentations over growers’ supposed 
shortcomings, refers essentially to two separate but inter-linked notions. ‘A pro-
fessional farmer’ might suggest someone complying with the professional stand-
ards of his occupation, i.e. the farmer-agronomist, but it might also refer to some-
one with a good grip on farming as an economic enterprise, i.e. the farmer busi-
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nessman. The certification systems discussed relate in differing degrees to these 
distinct notions of professionalism. GLOBALGAP, through the concept of good 
agricultural practices, commitment to expert knowledge and a technical and sys-
tematic approach to production, resonates well with the first view. To the extent 
that GLOBALGAP is promoted to farmers as having the potential to enhance their 
business it is as a tool for increasing the efficiency of farm operations or as tool to 
convince buyers of their professional approach to farming. Fairtrade on the other 
hand is geared to foster professionalism in the second sense – by seeking to em-
power producers to make better deals and look for ways to improve their bottom 
line. While a common criticism of Fairtrade is that the scheme may work to lock 
farmers in unprofitable productive spheres, advocates of Fairtrade, backed up by 
impact studies (Nelson & Pound 2009), counter that Fairtrade in many cases ena-
bles diversification of income and facilitates business development. This has been 
attempted in the Windward Islands where WINFA and the NFTOs in 2008 used 
of the Fairtrade premium to buy an agro-processing plant with the intent of diver-
sifying into the production of jams, jellies and juices and to develop the estate on 
which the plant is situated for agro-tourism (Rose 2008). Where GLOBALGAP 
requires certificates from training sessions, Fairtrade requires business plans an-
chored in collective decision making processes. Marcella Harris, former president 
of WINFA puts it the following way: 
All around you hear farmers being told to work hard, to be 'businesslike'. A lot of 
farmers take that to mean that it has to be you alone fighting against the world. I 
don't agree. Another message farmers everywhere are being given is 'be efficient'. A 
lot of people interpret that to mean being independent, isolated even, but I don't be-
lieve it does. [...] I believe farmers, particularly smaller scale farmers, need to group 
and do certain things together to get better markets and get what they need so as to 
improve as producers (Harris 2004) 
The Sustainable Grower 
Both GLOBALGAP and Fairtrade seek to operationalize sustainable farming and 
are consequently sometimes referred to as ‘sustainability standards’ (Djama et al. 
2011). GLOBALGAP refers prolifically to sustainability in its promotional mate-
rial and communication to members, claiming for instance to be ‘the world’s most 
widely accepted standard of food safety and sustainability’ (GLOBALG.A.P. 
2012). Fairtrade International meanwhile recently published a position paper enti-
tled ‘Fairtrade’s Contribution to a More Sustainable World’ spelling out the 
Fairtrade philosophy on sustainable development (2010). Both certification sys-
tems lay claim to a holistic approach covering environmental, economic and so-
cial dimensions of sustainability but treat each of these dimensions differently. 
Fairtrade emphasises the inherently positive contributions of growers as mem-
bers of farming communities and society at large. In terms of economic sustaina-
bility Fairtrade argues that the main responsibility for the marginality of third 
world producers does not belong with the producers themselves, but with the 
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market place and consumption patterns. In this view, economic sustainability ena-
bles and is a prerequisite for social and environmental sustainability, the argument 
being that producers in a hand-to-mouth existence cannot reasonably be expected 
to prioritize longer term objectives. The Fairtrade minimum price and premium is 
intended to rectify this. Just as central, however, is the idea that collective action, 
encouraged through the SPO and the premium, contributes positively to social, 
environmental, and economic sustainability. In contrast, GLOBALGAP always 
construed food safety, environmental protection and worker welfare as intercon-
nected objectives with an ICM approach taken to deliver positive results with re-
spect to each (Möller 1999). Compared with Fairtrade therefore, GLOBALGAP is 
more specific in its detailed involvement in farm operations. GLOBALGAP’s 
approach to social and environmental sustainability is focused on the farm level, 
on the conditions of and activities on the production site and the competence of 
producers. A sustainable farm is understood as a farm adhering to good agricul-
tural practice as defined by experts. To ensure sustainability the system had to be 
designed in such a way that this practice was rendered auditable, and to make sure 
that expert knowledge was respected by producers the scheme was devised with a 
strong emphasis on monitoring and sanctions. In GLOBALGAP’s vision of sus-
tainable agriculture, the onus is on the individual grower.  
GLOBALGAP differs from Fairtrade in not offering an economic incentive 
such as a price premium for growers to comply with the standards. It is argued 
that producers benefit from certification by becoming more attractive to buyers, 
but in cases such as in the Windward Islands, where certification was made a re-
quirement for remaining in the market, that argument rings hollow. The fact is 
that the multiples that back GLOBALGAP and demand certification of their sup-
pliers are in a position where they do not need to offer economic incentives since 
the standard has become a de facto market entry requirement. Producers may face 
considerable investments in bringing farms into compliance, and on top of that 
comes the economic burden of certification itself (de Battisti, et al. 2009). This 
additional economic strain, in already difficult times, may impact adversely on 
Windward Island banana growers’ ability to operate in a sustainable fashion. 
However, I found clear indications that GLOBALGAP had brought with it signif-
icant improvements to certain aspects of farm operations in St. Vincent, perhaps 
most significantly with respect to the handling and storage of pesticides. When I 
asked growers during interviews if and how they had benefitted from GLOBAL-
GAP certification, they frequently mentioned increased awareness on the use of 
protective equipment and the value more generally of training sessions on dealing 
with pesticide use, hygiene and first aid.  
As suggested in the discussion of accountability, Fairtrade’s emphasis on social 
solidarity and collective action may not be entirely uncontroversial with growers. 
In St. Vincent, the NFTO sought through media and meetings to actively dissemi-
nate information on the accomplishments of the Fairtrade venture. The impression 
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created is one of farmers pulling together. Yet, the emphasis on collective action 
could be difficult to accept for many Vincentian farmers who seemed more inter-
ested in how they could personally benefit from Fairtrade than in how they, 
through Fairtrade could contribute to the common good. Discussions in Fairtrade 
group meetings revealed that farmers were often hesitant or unwilling to contrib-
ute time and labour, whether it was for clean-up campaigns, road improvements or 
other community projects. When I asked Fairtrade certified farmers if they were 
contented with the way the social premium had been spent it was frequently ar-
gued that more money should find its way back to the farmers, e.g. through subsi-
dies on farm inputs or other kinds of assistance. These sentiments were likely a 
reflection of the difficulties which continue to face the industry under Fairtrade, 
yet are interesting in indicating that also Fairtrade farmers can be critical of 
Fairtrade’s social profile 
Conclusion 
The co-implementation of Fairtrade and GLOBALGAP in the Windward Islands 
banana industry demonstrates that standards and certification schemes, far from 
representing a depoliticized governance technology, are political devices and that 
even when their objectives overlap their rationalities promote different under-
standings of common concepts. In this case the standard systems addressed a pre-
existing tension within the banana industry concerning its fundamental role in 
society, society’s responsibilities toward farmers and farmers’ responsibilities 
toward society. In other words, the standards speak to the issue of the value of 
farmers and farming, and they constitute packaged technologies whereby the in-
dustry and its farmers can recreate themselves.  
The CGP sought to recreate the industry around a core of progressive growers 
who would be competitive and able to deliver what the market required if given 
the right kind of support. This grower was construed as an atomized subject and 
along with the farm constituted a self-contained unit. The basic premise was that 
all those farmer-farm-units, if fitting the bill, would stack up nicely like standard-
ized bricks and make a strong structure, i.e. a competitive industry. GLOBAL-
GAP, as a global standard takes this notion one step further. Its objective is not to 
transform the Windward Islands banana industry or its farmers, but to transform 
agriculture on a global scale. GLOBALGAP presents farm-farmer units globally 
with the same standard, asking them to adapt and paying no heed to local condi-
tions. The techno-scientific rationality at its core, including the valorization of 
audit technology and individual accountability is promulgated as a consequence of 
retailers’ flexing of market muscle in buyer-driven commodity chains (Gereffi & 
Korzeniewicz 1994). When the standard addresses producer groups it is only as 
means to enable the further spread of this recipe for safe and sustainable agricul-
ture to smallholders. In the context of the Windward Islands banana industry 
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GLOBALGAP picked up where the CGP left off, favouring the same farmers that 
the CGP attempted to single out. However, this rationality was challenged by the 
growers themselves who in the face of impending loss of trade preferences turned 
to Fairtrade. Fairtrade dismisses the notion that the grower should be recreated to 
stay afloat in a free market. Rather, the Fairtrade standards build on the assump-
tion that sustainable production requires changed consumption patterns and trade 
relations, and consequently aims to recreate the very value chain. Using certifica-
tion technology, Fairtrade seeks to do this by connecting producers and consumers 
through the Fairtrade label. These ideas resonate well with growers in the Wind-
ward Islands who have a long history of getting short-changed for their strenuous 
efforts. However, Fairtrade’s emphasis on social commitment and the producer 
organization as a key driver for development does not sit equally well with all 
growers. For some of the larger ones it represents a step in the wrong direction, 
resembling the cross-subsidization practices that the BGAs had been accused of 
prior to the restructuring.  
The fact remains that the Windward Islands banana industry depends on the 
UK retail markets and that in order to retain those markets a large share of the 
growers must be both GLOBALGAP and Fairtrade certified. Being de facto man-
datory for UK market entry the two certification systems have become intricately 
entangled in the sphere of production. In a number of respects they complement 
each other, yet the systems also work to reproduce a tension between two visions 
of farmers and farming. By taking a historical approach to the role of certification 
in the banana industry I have wanted to show that this tension preceded the certi-
fication schemes and informed farmers’ perceptions of them. But I have also 
wanted to demonstrate how the co-implementation of standards has had the unin-
tended effect of sustaining a tension between conflicting ideas on relations be-
tween producers and markets, individuals and collectives, and control and em-
powerment, as well as on key concepts such as accountability, adaptability, pro-
fessionalism and sustainability. 
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Notes 
1  A note on the nomenclature employed in this article: I find it useful to follow Litjens et al. 
(2011) in distinguishing between standards and schemes, the latter referring to the added lay-
er of rules whereby the former is enforced. Certification represents one set of such enforce-
ment technologies. I refer to the totality of standards and schemes as ‘standard systems’ and 
use the term‘certification system’ to refer to the totality of a standard and a certification 
scheme.  
2  WIBDECO rebranded itself as Winfresh in 2010 but in the following I will consistently use 
the old name.  
3  ‘Multiples’ refers to the supermarket chains, i.e. retailers with multiple stores. By the mid-
1990s in the UK, four multiples accounted for more than half of the total food sales. Fifteen 
multiples, defined as chains with more than ten stores, accounted for nearly two thirds of the 
total sales area but only one seventh of the total number of stores (Lang 1999: 179).  
4  The name was initially Fairtrade Labelling Organizations International (FLO), reflecting its 
original membership of national labelling organizations. The membership has since been ex-
panded to include three producer networks and three marketing organizations and in 2011 the 
name was changed to Fairtrade International.  
5  In late 2009 FLO’s standard unit began a process of reviewing the framework of the stand-
ards, culminating with the release of a ‘revamped’ version in May 2011. According to 
Fairtrade International (2011) the standard was rewritten in a simpler language, restructured, 
and a new scoring system was introduced with the intent of allowing producers more freedom 
in choosing how to achieve development. Apart from a strengthening of certain environmen-
tal requirements, however, the revision did not substantially change the content of the stand-
ards.  
6  Fairtrade standards were first written only for SPOs, but now also exist for hired labour situa-
tions for certain product types. This is a controversial issue within the Fairtrade movement, 
however, with some arguing that the nature of plantations is irreconcilable with the goals of 
Fairtrade (Equal Exchange 2009). 
7  Such fears may have been bolstered by an outright challenge of industry leadership in St. 
Lucia where banana growers in 1993 went on a strike led by a group calling itself the Banana 
Salvation Committee (Slocum 2006; Moberg 2008). 
8  For the sake of convenience I will in the consistently refer to the standards and the scheme as 
GLOBALGAP. 
9  A dilemma for the Fairtrade standard setters is the extent to which environmental require-
ments necessitate more formalized accountability from the grower. The line currently taken 
seems to be that growers, given that they have the necessary knowledge, economic leeway 
and social encouragement to act in an environmentally friendly manner, will choose to do so. 
Fairtrade, however, is not promoted as a strict environmental standard and producer groups 
interested in going beyond the Fairtrade standards in that respect are often encouraged to 
adopt organic production practices. Organic standards require more formalized producer ac-
countability though the mechanism of an internal control system (Grosch 2000).  
10  It deserves mentioning that several steps have been taken to make GLOBALGAP more 
smallholder friendly, e.g. by developing illustrated guidelines which explain basic concepts 
and practices. GLOBALGAP also encourages the establishment of National Technical Work-
ing Groups to adapt standards to different national settings.  
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